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2 Atmospheric composition, irreversible climate change, and mitigation policy

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16

17 Abstract

18 The Earth's atmosphere is changing due to anthropogenic increases of gases and aerosols  
19 that influence the planetary energy budget. Policy has long been challenged to ensure  
20 that instruments such as the Kyoto Protocol or carbon trading deal with the wide range of  
21 lifetimes of these radiative forcing agents. Recent research has sharpened scientific  
22 understanding of how climate system time scales interact with the time scales of the  
23 forcing agents themselves. This has led to an improved understanding of metrics used to  
24 compare different forcing agents, and has prompted consideration of new metrics such as  
25 cumulative carbon. Research has also clarified the understanding that short-lived  
26 forcing agents can "trim the peak" of coming climate change, while long-lived agents,  
27 especially carbon dioxide, will be responsible for at least a millennium of elevated  
28 temperatures and altered climate, even if emissions were to cease. We suggest that  
29 these vastly differing characteristics imply that a single basket for trading among forcing  
30 agents is incompatible with current scientific understanding.

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33

34 1. Introduction

35

36 Anthropogenic increases in the concentrations of greenhouse gases and aerosols perturb  
37 the Earth's energy budget, and cause a radiative forcing<sup>1</sup> of the climate system.

38 Collectively, greenhouse gases and aerosols can be considered radiative forcing agents,  
39 which lead to either increased (positive forcing) or decreased (negative forcing) global  
40 mean temperature, with associated changes in other aspects of climate such as  
41 precipitation and sea level rise. Here we briefly survey the range of anthropogenic  
42 greenhouse gases and aerosols that contribute to present and future climate change,  
43 focusing on time scales of the global anthropogenic climate changes and their  
44 implications for mitigation options.

45

46 Differences in atmospheric residence times across the suite of anthropogenic forcing  
47 agents have long been recognized. As decision makers weigh near-term and long-term  
48 mitigation actions and tradeoffs, residence times of forcing agents are important along  
49 with social, economic, and political issues, such as climate change impacts, costs, and  
50 risks sustained by later versus earlier generations (and how these are valued). Recent  
51 research has rekindled and deepened the understanding (advanced by Hansen et al., 1997;  
52 Shine et al., 2005) that climate changes caused by anthropogenic increases in gases and  
53 aerosols can last considerably longer than the gases or aerosols themselves, due to the  
54 key role played by the time scales and processes that govern climate system responses.

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<sup>1</sup> Radiative forcing is defined (e.g., IPCC, 2007) as the change in the net irradiance (downward minus upward, generally expressed in W m<sup>-2</sup>) at the tropopause due to a change in an external driver of the Earth's energy budget, such as, for example, a change in the concentration of carbon dioxide.

55 The climate changes due to the dominant anthropogenic forcing agent, carbon dioxide,  
56 should be thought of as essentially irreversible on time scales of at least a thousand years  
57 (Matthews and Caldeira, 2008; Plattner et al., 2008; Solomon et al., 2009, 2010).

58

59 The largely irreversible nature of the climate changes due to anthropogenic carbon  
60 dioxide has stimulated a great deal of recent research, which is beginning to be  
61 considered within the policy community. Some research studies have focused on how  
62 cumulative carbon dioxide may represent a new metric of utility for policy, as a result of  
63 the identification of a near-linear relationship between its cumulative emissions and  
64 resulting global mean warming. In this paper, we discuss the use of cumulative carbon  
65 to help frame present and future climate changes and carbon policy formulation. We  
66 also briefly summarize several other metrics such as e.g., carbon dioxide equivalent  
67 concentration, the global warming potential (GWP) and global temperature change  
68 potential (GTP). Finally, we examine how current scientific understanding of the  
69 importance of time scales not just of different forcing agents, but also of their interactions  
70 with the climate system, sharpens the identification of approaches to formulate effective  
71 mitigation policies across a range of radiative forcing agents.

72

73 2. The mix of gases and aerosols contributing to climate change

74

75 A great deal of recent research has focused on understanding changes in atmospheric  
76 composition, chemistry, and the individual roles of the range of forcing agents and  
77 precursor emissions (leading to the formation of indirect forcing agents after emission) as

78 contributors to observed and future climate change (Forster et al., 2007; Montzka et al.,  
79 2011). It is not our goal to review that literature here, but rather to briefly summarize the  
80 state of knowledge of contributions of different species to global radiative forcing and  
81 time scales of related climate change, and to identify some implications for mitigation  
82 policy.

83 The concentrations of the major greenhouse gases carbon dioxide, methane, and nitrous  
84 oxide have increased due to human activities, and ice core data show that these gases  
85 have now reached concentrations not experienced on Earth in at least several thousand  
86 years (Luthi et al., 2008; Joos and Spahni, 2008; MacFarling-Meure et al., 2008).

87 Figure 1 depicts the dramatic increase in carbon dioxide that has taken place over about  
88 the past century. The recent rates of increase in CO<sub>2</sub>, CH<sub>4</sub>, and N<sub>2</sub>O are unprecedented  
89 in at least 20,000 years (Joos and Spahni, 2008). The abundances of CO<sub>2</sub>, N<sub>2</sub>O and  
90 CH<sub>4</sub> are well-mixed over the globe, and hence their concentration changes (and radiative  
91 forcings) are well characterized from data such as that shown in Figure 1; see Table 1.

92

93 If anthropogenic emissions of the various gases were to cease, their concentrations would  
94 decline at a rate governed by physical and chemical processes that remove them from the  
95 global atmosphere. Most greenhouse gases are destroyed by photochemistry in the  
96 Earth's atmosphere, including direct photolysis and attack by highly reactive chemical  
97 species such as the OH free radical. Many aerosols are removed largely by washout.

98 Carbon dioxide is a unique greenhouse gas that is subject to a series of removal processes  
99 and biogeochemical cycling with the ocean and land biosphere, and even the lithosphere,  
100 leading to a very long "tail" characterizing a portion of its removal (Archer et al., 1997).

101 While the carbon dioxide concentration changes and anthropogenic radiative forcing  
102 since 1750 are very well established, the relationship of its concentration changes to  
103 changes in emission (including those from land use) is much less well characterized, due  
104 to the flow of those emissions through the carbon cycle. A few industrial greenhouse  
105 gases have lifetimes of many hundreds or even thousands of years, due to their extreme  
106 chemical and photochemical stability and represent nearly “immortal” chemicals; in  
107 particular, the fully fluorinated compounds such as CF<sub>4</sub>, NF<sub>3</sub>, and C<sub>2</sub>F<sub>6</sub> fall in this  
108 category. These gases also are strong absorbers of infrared radiation on a per molecule  
109 basis. While these gases are currently present in very small concentrations, like carbon  
110 dioxide their contributions to climate change are essentially irreversible on thousand year  
111 time scales even if policies were to lead to reduced or zero emissions.

112 Table 1 summarizes the lifetimes (or, in the case of CO<sub>2</sub>, multiple removal time scales)  
113 that influence the contributions of the range of gases and aerosols to radiative forcing and  
114 climate change. Some related uncertainties in lifetimes and distributions are also  
115 highlighted.

116 Direct emissions and other human actions (such as land disturbances, and emissions of  
117 precursor gases) have increased the atmospheric burdens of particles, including mineral  
118 dust, black carbon, sulfate, and organics. Tropospheric ozone has also increased largely  
119 as a result of emissions of precursor gases such as nitric oxide and organic molecules  
120 including volatiles as well as methane. Indirect forcings linked to atmospheric aerosols  
121 involving changes in clouds may also be very important, and are subject to very large  
122 uncertainties (Forster et al., 2007). The short atmospheric lifetimes of aerosols and  
123 tropospheric ozone lead to very large variations in their abundances depending upon

124 proximity to local sources and transport, increasing the uncertainty in estimates of their  
125 global mean forcing as well as its spatial distribution (see Table 1).  
126  
127 Observations (e.g. of total optical depth by satellites or ground-based methods) constrain  
128 the net total optical depth, or the transparency of the atmosphere, and provide information  
129 on the total direct radiative forcing due to the sum of all aerosols better than they do the  
130 forcing due to individual types of aerosol. Many aerosols are observed to be internal  
131 mixtures, i.e., of mixed composition such as sulfate and organics, which substantially  
132 affects optical properties and hence radiative forcing (see the review by Kanakidou et al.,  
133 2005, and references therein). Aerosols lead to perturbations of the top-of-atmosphere  
134 and surface radiation budgets that are highly variable in space, and depend on the place as  
135 well as amount of emissions. Limited historical data for emissions or concentrations of  
136 aerosols imply far larger uncertainties in their radiative forcings since pre-industrial times  
137 than for the well-mixed gases (see Table 1). Current research focuses on understanding  
138 the extent to which some regional climate changes may reflect local climate feedbacks to  
139 global forcing (e.g., Boer and Yu, 2003a,b), versus local responses to spatially variable  
140 forcings. For example, increases in local black carbon and tropospheric ozone (e.g.,  
141 Shindell and Faluvegi, 2009) may have contributed to the high rates of warming observed  
142 in the Arctic compared to other parts of the globe. Sulfate aerosols (which are present in  
143 higher concentrations in the northern hemisphere due to industrial emissions) have been  
144 suggested as a driver of changes in the north-south temperature gradients and rainfall  
145 patterns (e.g., Rotstayn and Lohmann, 2002; Chang et al., 2011). Shortwave-absorbing  
146 aerosols change the vertical distribution of solar absorption, causing energy that would

147 have been absorbed at the surface and communicated upward by convection to be directly  
148 absorbed in the atmosphere instead; this can potentially lead to changes in precipitation  
149 and atmospheric circulation even in the absence of warming (e.g. Menon et al. 2002). The  
150 large uncertainties in the short-lived forcing terms as well as the regional climate signals  
151 they may be inducing have heightened interest in their relevance for mitigation policy,  
152 and this is discussed further below (see e.g., Ramanathan and Feng, 2008; Jackson, 2009;  
153 Hansen et al., 1997; Jacobson, 2002; UNEP, 2011; Shindell et al., 2012).

154

### 155 3. Metrics

156 Given the very broad diversity of anthropogenic substances with the potential to alter  
157 Earth's climate (e.g., CO<sub>2</sub>, CH<sub>4</sub>, N<sub>2</sub>O, SF<sub>6</sub>, CFCs, HFC's, absorbing and reflecting  
158 aerosols, chemical precursors, etc.), it is a challenging task to compare the climate effect  
159 of a unit emission of (for example) carbon dioxide, with one of methane or sulfur  
160 dioxide. Nevertheless, there has been a demand for such comparisons, and various  
161 metrics have been proposed. The purpose of such metrics is to boil a complex set of  
162 influences down to a few numbers that can be used to aid the process of thinking about  
163 how different emissions choices would affect future climate. Among other uses, metrics  
164 have been used to simplify the formulation of climate-related policy actions, climate-  
165 protection treaties and emissions trading schemes. We suggest that to the extent  
166 possible, a metric (or set of metrics) should not impose value judgments, least of all  
167 hidden value judgments (see Fuglestedt et al., 2003). Metrics should provide a  
168 simplified yet clear set of tools that the policy makers can use to formulate policy  
169 implementations to achieve an agreed set of climate protection ends.

170

171

### 172 3.1 Radiative forcing and CO<sub>2</sub>-equivalent concentration

173 Radiative forcing is one measure of the influence of the burden of a range of forcing  
174 agents on the Earth's radiative budget at a given point in time. A closely related metric  
175 sometimes used to compare the relative effects of the range of forcing agents is to express  
176 them as CO<sub>2</sub>-equivalent concentrations, which is the concentration of CO<sub>2</sub> that would  
177 cause the same radiative forcing at the chosen time as a given mix of CO<sub>2</sub> and other  
178 chemicals (including greenhouse gases and aerosols).

179

180 Figure 2 shows the CO<sub>2</sub>-equivalent concentration estimates for a range of major forcing  
181 agents based on radiative forcing for 2005 from Forster et al. (2007), as given in NRC  
182 (2011). The figure shows that among the major forcing agents, by far the largest  
183 uncertainties stem from aerosols. Because aerosols represent a substantial negative  
184 forcing (cooling effect), this leads to large uncertainty in the net total CO<sub>2</sub>-equivalent  
185 concentration that is driving current observed global climate change. Current warming  
186 represents a transient response that is about half as large as it would become in the long  
187 term quasi-equilibrium state if radiative forcing were to be stabilized (NRC, 2011).

188 Therefore, uncertainties in today's total CO<sub>2</sub>-equivalent concentration imply large  
189 uncertainties in how close current loadings of forcing agents may be to eventually  
190 warming the climate by more than the 2°C target noted in the Copenhagen Accord. As  
191 Figure 2 shows, uncertainties in aerosols dominate the uncertainties in total net radiative



192 forcing or total CO<sub>2</sub>-equivalent concentration. If aerosol forcing is large, then much of  
193 the radiative effect of increases in greenhouse gases is currently being masked by  
194 cooling, implying a larger climate sensitivity and far greater risk of large future climate  
195 change than if aerosol forcing is small.

196

197 A key limitation of radiative forcing or CO<sub>2</sub>-equivalent concentrations as metrics is that  
198 they do not include any information about the time scale of the impact of the forcing  
199 agent. For example, the radiative forcing for a very short-lived forcing agent may be  
200 very high at a given time but would drop rapidly if emissions were to decrease, while a  
201 longer-lived constituent implies a commitment to further climate change even if  
202 emissions were to stop altogether.

203

204 Insofar as short-lived aerosols produce a cooling, their masking of a part of the impact of  
205 the large load of long-lived warming agents implies that an unseen long-term  
206 commitment has already been made to more future warming (e.g. Armour and Roe, 2011;  
207 Ramanathan and Feng, 2008); Hansen describes this as a “Faustian bargain”, since short-  
208 lived aerosol masking can be accompanied by accumulation of more long-lasting and  
209 hence ultimately more dangerous levels of carbon dioxide and other long-lived  
210 greenhouse gases in the atmosphere (e.g., Hansen and Lacis, 1990).

211

212 It is evident that other metrics beyond radiative forcing are needed to capture temporal  
213 aspects of the climate change problem. One needs to compare not only the effect of  
214 various substances on today’s climate change but also how current and past emissions

215 affect future climate change. As will be shown, available metrics all simplify or neglect  
216 aspects of temporal information related to individual gases (albeit in different ways), and  
217 hence incorporate choices and judgments rather than representing “pure” physical science  
218 metrics (Fuglestvedt et al., 2003; Manne and Richels, 2001; O’Neill, 2000; Manning and  
219 Reisinger, 2011; Smith and Wigley, 2000; Shine, 2009).

220

221 The problem of formulating a metric for comparing climate impacts of emissions of  
222 various greenhouse gases is challenging because it requires consideration of the widely  
223 differing atmospheric lifetimes of the gases. Emissions metrics are of most interest,  
224 since it is emissions (rather than concentrations) that are subject to direct control. The  
225 lifetime affects the way concentrations are related to emissions. For a short-lived gas like  
226 CH<sub>4</sub>, the concentrations are a function of emissions averaged over a relatively short  
227 period of time (on the order of a few decades in the case of CH<sub>4</sub>). For example, while  
228 anthropogenic emissions increase, the CH<sub>4</sub> concentration increases but if anthropogenic  
229 emissions of CH<sub>4</sub> were to be kept constant, the concentration of the gas would reach a  
230 plateau within a few decades. In contrast, for a very persistent gas like CO<sub>2</sub>, the  
231 concentration is linked to the cumulative anthropogenic emission since the time when  
232 emissions first began; concentrations continue to increase without bound so long as  
233 emissions are significantly different from zero. In essence, a fixed reduction of emission  
234 rate of a short-lived gas yields a step-reduction in radiative forcing, whereas the same  
235 reduction of emission rate of a very long-lived gas only yields a reduction in the rate of  
236 growth of radiative forcing.

237

238 3.2  $GWP_h$  and  $GTP_h$

239

240 The most familiar and widely applied metric for comparing greenhouse gases with  
241 disparate atmospheric lifetimes is the Global Warming Potential (GWP). The GWP is  
242 defined as the ratio of the time-integrated (over some time horizon) radiative forcing due  
243 to a pulse emission of a unit of a given gas, to an emission of the same amount of a  
244 reference gas (Forster et al., 2007). This can be expressed as:

245

$$246 \quad GWP_h = \frac{\int_0^h \Delta A \Delta C(t) dt}{\int_0^h \Delta A_r \Delta C_r(t) dt} \quad (1)$$

247

248 where  $h$  is a specified time horizon,  $\Delta C(t)$  is the time series of the change in  
249 concentration of the greenhouse gas under consideration (relative to some baseline  
250 value), and  $\Delta C_r(t)$  that of the reference gas (usually  $CO_2$ , as we shall assume throughout  
251 the following).  $\Delta A$  (and  $\Delta A_r$ ) represent the radiative efficiencies due to changes in  
252 concentration of the greenhouse gas (and reference gas) following a pulse emission at  
253  $t=0$ . In the remainder of this paper, we refer specifically to  $GWP_h$  and  $GTP_h$  to  
254 emphasize the key role of the time horizon. If the pulse is small enough, the radiative  
255 forcing is linear relative to the size of the emission pulse; the conventional assumption is  
256 therefore that  $GWP_h$  is independent of the size of the pulse. This assumption of linearity  
257 can lead to substantial errors when the  $GWP_h$  is extrapolated from an infinitesimal pulse  
258 to very large emissions. Such errors can arise from nonlinearities in the radiative forcing  
259 due to changes in concentration of the emitted gas or that of the reference gas  $CO_2$ .

260

261 For gases with short atmospheric lifetimes (e.g. methane), the peak of concentration  
262 that immediately follows a pulse in emission decays rapidly to zero, leading to a strong  
263 dependence of  $GWP_h$  on the timescale over which it is calculated ( $h$  in Equation 1). Table  
264 2.14 in Forster et al. (2007) gives  $GWP_h$  for a variety of gases, with  $h = 20, 100$  and  $500$   
265 years. Methane for example, has a 100-year  $GWP_h$  ( $GWP_{100}$ ) of 25, but a  $GWP_{500}$  of only  
266 7.6. The choice of time horizon is crudely equivalent to the imposition of a discount rate,  
267 albeit a discount rate that varies with lifetime of the gas (Manne and Richels, 2001), and  
268 thus represents a value judgment. A choice of small  $h$  implies that one should not care  
269 that  $CO_2$  saddles the future with an essentially permanent alteration of climate, whereas  
270 the choice of a very large  $h$  says that one should not care about the transient warming due  
271 to short-lived greenhouse gases. Either assumption embeds a judgment regarding whether  
272 the near term future is to be valued above the long term future, or vice versa.

273

274 An additional concern with the  $GWP_h$  is that it represents only the change in integrated  
275 forcing due to the emission of different gases, rather than the change in (for example)  
276 global-mean temperature. This has led to the proposal of modified metrics, such as the  
277 Global Temperature Potential ( $GTP_h$ ) put forward by Shine et al. (2005). The  $GTP_h$   
278 represents the temperature change at some point  $h$  in time (rather than time-integrated  
279 radiative forcing) resulting from the unit emission of a greenhouse gas, relative to the  
280 same emission of carbon dioxide.

281

282 In order to illustrate some of the consequences of using  $GTP_h$  or  $GWP_h$  as climate change  
283 metrics for gases of different atmospheric lifetimes, we use a simple two-layer ocean

284 model to translate radiative forcing and surface temperature change over time. This  
 285 model is a simpler version of the upwelling-diffusion model used in Shine et al.(2005) to  
 286 critique GWP<sub>h</sub>, and has also been proved useful in analyzing the transient climate  
 287 response in full general circulation models (Winton et al, 2010; Held et al., 2010). The  
 288 model consists of a shallow mixed layer with temperature anomaly  $dT'_{\text{mix}}$  and heat  
 289 capacity  $\mu_{\text{mix}}$  coupled to a deep ocean with temperature anomaly  $dT'_{\text{deep}}$  and heat  
 290 capacity  $\mu_{\text{deep}} \gg \mu_{\text{mix}}$ . The mixed layer loses heat to space (in part via coupling to the  
 291 atmosphere) at a rate proportional to its temperature. The equations are

292

$$293 \quad m_{\text{mix}} \{dT'_{\text{mix}}/dt\} = -lT'_{\text{mix}} - g(T'_{\text{mix}} - T'_{\text{deep}}) + \Delta F(t) \quad (2)$$

294

$$295 \quad m_{\text{deep}} \{dT'_{\text{deep}}/dt\} = -g(T'_{\text{deep}} - T'_{\text{mix}}) \quad (3)$$

296

297 For constant radiative forcing  $\Delta F$ , this model<sup>2</sup> has the steady solution  $T'_{\text{mix}} = T'_{\text{deep}} = \Delta F/l$ .  
 298 Hence  $1/l$  gives the quasi-equilibrium climate sensitivity. The model relaxes to this  
 299 equilibrium state on two time scales. On the short time scale (generally a matter of a few  
 300 years), the mixed layer relaxes to a near-equilibrium with the atmosphere but the deep  
 301 ocean has not yet had time to warm up, so  $T'_{\text{deep}} \approx 0$ . The transient climate response  
 302 during this stage is then  $T'_{\text{mix}} = \Delta F/(1 + g)$ . If  $\Delta F$  is reduced to zero some time after the  
 303 deep ocean has warmed up to some nonzero value  $T'_{\text{deep}}$ , then on the short mixed layer  
 304 time scale  $T'_{\text{mix}}$  only falls to  $T'_{\text{deep}} g/(1 + g)$ , and subsequently relaxes to zero on the slow  
 305 deep ocean time scale. This term is the “recalcitrant warming” due to heat burial in the

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<sup>2</sup> The parameters we use in the following are:  $\mu_{\text{deep}} = 20\mu_{\text{mix}} = 200\text{J/m}^2\text{K}$  and  $\gamma = \lambda = 2\text{W/m}^2\text{K}$ .

306 deep ocean (Held et al., 2010).

307

308 Figure 3(a) shows the calculated temperature response of the mixed layer in this model  
309 due to pulse emissions of greenhouse gases with various lifetimes and forcing  
310 efficiencies. In this calculation, the radiative forcing is assumed to be linear in the  
311 concentration, and the concentration is assumed to decay exponentially with the stated  
312 lifetime. The magnitude of the emission of each gas is chosen so that all correspond to  
313 the same value when weighted by  $GWP_{100}$ ; i.e., for a pulse emission, the radiative forcing  
314 integrated over 100 years is identical in all cases. Figure 3 shows that the  $GWP_{100}$   
315 weighted emission for a gas with a 10-year (methane-like) lifetime and radiative  
316 efficiency can be the same as for the longer lived gases, since a weaker long-term  
317 warming can be compensated by a larger short term warming. If the integrated warming  
318 over the 100 year period is all we care about, and the damages are linear in warming, then  
319 these cases may indeed all be considered to have identical impact in that the methane-like  
320 case produces larger damages for a short time, as opposed to a longer period with smaller  
321 damages for the longer-lived gases. However, if the objective is to limit the magnitude of  
322 warming when the 100 year time span is reached, the use of  $GWP_{100}$  greatly exaggerates  
323 the importance of the short-lived gas, since virtually all of the warming has disappeared  
324 after 100 years. This is a starting point for considering the value of the alternative concept  
325 of Global Temperature-Change Potential ( $GTP_h$ ) as in Shine et al. (2005). Measured in  
326 terms of 100-year  $GTP_h$ , the 10-year lifetime gas has only 1/4.5 times the impact of e.g.,  
327 a 1000 year gas with identical  $GWP_{100}$ . The warming after 100 years even in the 10-year  
328 lifetime case has not decayed to zero as quickly as the radiative forcing itself (which has

329 decayed by a factor of  $4.5 \times 10^{-5}$  over this time). The persistent, or recalcitrant warming  
330 arises largely from ocean heat uptake (Solomon et al., 2010). But it should also be  
331 emphasized that the 100-year  $GTP_h$  does not capture the impact of the large short-term  
332 warming from the methane-like case. Such short-term warming could be significant if,  
333 for example, the near-term rate of temperature change were leading to adaptation stresses.

334

335 Although  $GTP_h$  may be a superior metric to  $GWP_h$  for implementing climate protection  
336 goals based on a threshold temperature at a given time, it does not resolve the problem of  
337 sensitivity to the time frame chosen when computing the metric. Based on 100-year  
338  $GTP_h$ , emitting an amount of a 1000-year lifetime gas might be considered to be about  
339 twice as bad as an emission of a 50-year lifetime gas; however the long lived gas leads to  
340 a warming that is nearly constant over the next 200 years whereas the warming due to the  
341 50-year gas has largely disappeared by the end of that time. These two cases result in  
342 radically different temperature changes over time and clearly do not represent identical  
343 climate outcomes.

344 An additional problem with both  $GWP_h$  and  $GTP_h$  is their dependence on the emission  
345 scenario. Figure 3a above represents the case of a pulse emission while Figure 3b shows  
346 a second case with constant emissions of a methane-like gas with a 10-year lifetime,  
347 compared to constant emissions of a gas with an infinite lifetime (see e.g., Shine, 2005).  
348 In both Figures 3a and b, the emissions scenarios were selected such that the  $GWP_{100}$   
349 values are equivalent. Emissions are sustained for 200 years, and then set to zero at the  
350 year 200. In both cases, the warming continues beyond the point at which the  
351 concentration of the gas stabilizes; in the case of the methane-like gas, the concentration

352 (not shown) stabilizes after about 10 years but warming continues to increase, illustrating  
353 the continuing warming that occurs despite constant atmospheric concentrations, as the  
354 deep ocean takes up heat. For the infinitely long-lived gas, concentrations remain  
355 elevated even after emission stops, and warming continues to increase (see next section).  
356 Indeed, although both cases are equivalent in terms of  $GWP_{100}$ -weighted emissions, the  
357 infinite-lifetime case leads to a warming that is not only larger at the end of 200 years,  
358 but persists for centuries afterwards. The constant-emissions case illustrates the  
359 dependence of  $GTP_h$  on the emissions scenario. Neither  $GWP_h$  nor  $GTP_h$  capture what  
360 occurs after emissions cease.

361 As a final example, we have carried out a series of calculations driven by the  $CO_2$  time  
362 series computed in Eby et al. (2009). The concentration time series were computed by  
363 driving an intermediate-complexity climate-carbon cycle model with historical emissions  
364 up to the calendar year 2000, followed by two test scenarios in which the emissions rate  
365 rises to a peak after 150 years, and then declines to zero in the subsequent 150 years. The  
366 two scenarios shown in Figure 3c show results corresponding to 640GtC and 1280GtC of  
367 post-2000 cumulative carbon emissions (see next section). Note that the warming is  
368 fairly constant in the 700 years following cessation of emission, given the realistic  
369 atmosphere  $CO_2$  used in this case as compared to the infinite-lifetime case shown in  
370 Figure 3b. Abating cumulative carbon by 640GtC (the difference between the two  
371 emission scenarios shown here) reduces warming by about 0.6K in the two-box model.

372

373 The dashed curves in Figure 3c show what happens if the radiative forcing from  $CO_2$  is  
374 augmented by that from methane released at a constant rate between 2000 and 2300, with



375 the total emissions again equivalent to the CO<sub>2</sub> from 640GtC based on weighting with a  
376 GWP<sub>100</sub> of 25 (Forster et al.(2007). The corresponding methane emission rate is 0.31 Gt  
377 per year, which is similar to the current anthropogenic emission rate of about 0.35 Gt per  
378 year (see <http://cdiac.ornl.gov/trends/meth/ch4.htm>). Emissions are stopped entirely in  
379 2300 in this example. One can think of the curve for 640GtC plus methane (dashed blue  
380 line) as the result of deciding to abate CO<sub>2</sub> emissions first and methane later, while the  
381 curve with 1280GtC and no methane (solid black line) corresponds to abating methane  
382 first and carbon later. It is useful to compare the “Methane First” to that for the “CO<sub>2</sub>  
383 First” case, recalling that both have the same GWP<sub>100</sub> weighted emissions. The blue  
384 dashed curve ramps up quickly and faster just after 2000 as expected from having more  
385 short-lived CH<sub>4</sub>. Overall, the two track quite well for the first 100 years (compare the  
386 solid black line with the dashed blue line), but thereafter the temperature for “CO<sub>2</sub> First”  
387 falls well below that for “Methane First.” Moreover, after methane emissions are  
388 eliminated, the dashed blue line (“CO<sub>2</sub> First”) case converges with the curve for 640GtC  
389 alone (solid blue line) within a century, as if methane had never been emitted at all.  
390 Figure 3c highlights the comparison between the two curves representing the “Methane  
391 First” vs. “CO<sub>2</sub> First” strategies. The shaded region mirrors the analysis of (Daniel et al  
392 2011), who used emissions and climate response models that were less idealized. The  
393 general lesson to be learned is that over the universe of strategies considered equivalent  
394 with regard to GWP<sub>100</sub>, an emphasis on short-lived forcing agents yields more near-term  
395 moderation of warming but comes at the expense of considerably greater long term  
396 warming.  
397

398 A comparison of the bottom two curves in Figure 3c, in contrast, illustrates the “peak  
399 trimming” benefits of reductions in short-lived forcing agents. However, a comparison of  
400 the lower two curves alone gives an incomplete picture of the decision framework. One  
401 will always get more warming reduction from doing two beneficial things rather than one  
402 beneficial thing, but the real question is whether one would get a still better consequence  
403 by putting added resources into further reductions of CO<sub>2</sub> versus applying them to short-  
404 lived agents.

405  
406 From the examples in Figure 3, it is clear that emissions of methane (and similarly other  
407 short-lived radiative forcing agents) have a strong bearing on the amount of warming  
408 during the time over which they are emitted, but have little lasting consequence for the  
409 climate system. By contrast, CO<sub>2</sub> and (and to a lesser extent other long-lived forcing  
410 agents) are relevant to both short- and long-term climate warming, and in particular  
411 generate warming which persists at significant levels long after emissions are eliminated.  
412 These fundamental differences between short- and long-lived radiative forcing agents  
413 cannot be captured by either GWP<sub>h</sub> or GTP<sub>h</sub> metrics, which by design can only provide  
414 comparisons for the chosen time horizon. Here we have illustrated key limitations of  
415 such an approach over time.

416

417 3.3. Irreversibility of CO<sub>2</sub>-induced warming, climate commitment, and the cumulative  
418 CO<sub>2</sub> emissions metric

419 As illustrated above, whereas shorter-lived gases and aerosols have a strong bearing on  
420 near-future climate changes, warming that persists beyond the 21st century, and  
421 particularly warming that persists beyond the period of time that humans emit

422 greenhouses gases, will be primarily determined by how much carbon dioxide is emitted  
423 over this period of time. Because of the long lifetime of carbon dioxide in the  
424 atmosphere compared to other major greenhouse gases, the long-term warming legacy of  
425 anthropogenic greenhouse gases will be primarily determined by CO<sub>2</sub>-induced warming.

426 In recent literature, the concept of the irreversibility of climate change due to CO<sub>2</sub>  
427 emissions was first highlighted by Matthews and Caldeira (2008) based upon results from  
428 an Earth Model of Intermediate Complexity (EMIC). This has led to the recognition that  
429 cumulative carbon (the total tonnes of carbon emitted) has particular utility for policy.  
430 Matthews and Caldeira (2008) showed that if CO<sub>2</sub> emissions were eliminated, globally-  
431 averaged temperature stabilized and remained approximately constant for several  
432 hundred years; notably, though CO<sub>2</sub> concentrations decreased in the atmosphere,  
433 temperatures remained at a nearly constant level, mainly as a result of a declining rate of  
434 heat uptake by the ocean that approximately balances the decline in carbon dioxide  
435 levels; for a detailed discussion see Solomon et al. (2010). Several other EMIC studies  
436 have also demonstrated the irreversibility of CO<sub>2</sub>-induced warming. Solomon et al  
437 (2009) showed that even after 1000 years of model simulation following the elimination  
438 of CO<sub>2</sub> emissions, global temperatures were essentially irreversible, remaining within  
439 about half a degree of their peak values for a broad range of emission rates and maximum  
440 concentrations. In an intercomparison of eight EMICs, Plattner et al (2008) showed  
441 persistence of high global temperatures for at least several centuries following zero  
442 emissions across all the models. More comprehensive global climate models require  
443 much more computer time and hence have thus far been run for zero emission tests over  
444 multiple centuries rather than millennia, and show similar results (Lowe et al 2009 and

445 Gillett et al 2011). These studies have confirmed that irreversibility of CO<sub>2</sub>-induced  
446 warming is a property of the climate system that is driven by basic properties of the  
447 system, notably the carbon and ocean heat timescales, and is not limited to intermediate-  
448 complexity models.

449 This body of literature has all contributed to estimating what has been called the “zero-  
450 emissions commitment”; that is the anticipated future warming that occurs in the absence  
451 of additional future CO<sub>2</sub> emissions. This quantity is distinct from another widely-used  
452 definition of committed warming: the “constant-composition commitment,” which is  
453 defined as the future global temperature change which would be expected under constant  
454 concentrations of atmospheric CO<sub>2</sub> (Meehl et al., 2007).

455 The difference between these two measures of committed future warming was  
456 highlighted by Matthews and Weaver (2011), and summarized in Figure 4a. Under  
457 constant atmospheric CO<sub>2</sub> concentrations, temperatures continue to increase as the  
458 climate system slowly adjusts to the current atmospheric forcing from CO<sub>2</sub> in the  
459 atmosphere. By contrast, if CO<sub>2</sub> emissions were set to zero, atmospheric CO<sub>2</sub> would  
460 decrease over time due to removal by carbon sinks, but global temperature would remain  
461 approximately constant for several centuries. This difference can also be seen in the  
462 example of the simple model shown above: constant composition of an infinite-lifetime  
463 gas after year 200 in Figure 3b leads to increasing global temperatures, whereas zero  
464 emissions of CO<sub>2</sub> at the year 2300 in Figure 3c leads to approximately stable global  
465 temperatures. Persistent warming over many centuries is especially relevant for  
466 understanding impacts including the large sea level rise that occurs in a warmer world  
467 due to slow thermal expansion of the deeper parts of the ocean and the potentially very

468 gradual loss of the great ice sheets of Greenland and Antarctica (Meehl et al., 2007 and  
469 references therein).

470

471 The difference between the constant-composition and zero-emission commitment can  
472 also be understood in terms of the CO<sub>2</sub> emissions associated with each scenario. Figure  
473 4b shows the historical emissions in blue associated with both scenarios, and the future  
474 emissions in red required to maintain constant CO<sub>2</sub> concentrations at year-2010 levels.  
475 Given the required balance between emissions and removal by carbon sinks to maintain  
476 constant atmospheric levels, the future emissions associated with a constant-composition  
477 scenario are substantially larger than zero; in this example, the total emissions over 300  
478 years required to maintain constant atmospheric CO<sub>2</sub> amount to about 250 GtC, or close  
479 to half of the total historical CO<sub>2</sub> emissions (about 500 GtC). These future emissions are  
480 consistent with the continued future warming associated with constant atmospheric CO<sub>2</sub>  
481 concentrations. By contrast, zero future emissions is consistent with near-zero additional  
482 future warming.

483 As already noted, the removal of anthropogenic CO<sub>2</sub> from the atmosphere involves a  
484 multitude of time scales, ranging from a few decades for uptake by the upper ocean and  
485 land biosphere, a millennium for uptake by the deep ocean, tens of millennia for  
486 carbonate dissolution and weathering to restore ocean alkalinity and allow further uptake,  
487 and hundreds of thousands of years for silicate weathering (Archer et al, 1997). The  
488 nonlinearity of the carbonate chemistry is important in determining the way climate  
489 change relates to larger and larger increases in CO<sub>2</sub>. Though the radiative forcing is

490 logarithmic as a function of CO<sub>2</sub> concentration, the carbonate chemistry implies that the  
491 fraction of CO<sub>2</sub> that remains in the atmosphere after emission increases with the  
492 magnitude of the emission (Eby et al., 2009). Further, the slow decay in radiative forcing  
493 due to ocean uptake of carbon following cessation of emissions occurs at roughly the  
494 same time scale as the relaxation of the deep ocean temperature towards equilibrium;  
495 because these two terms work in opposing directions, the surface temperature attained at  
496 the time emissions cease is not only proportional to the cumulative carbon, but is also the  
497 temperature which prevails with little change for roughly the next millennium (Matthews  
498 and Caldeira, 2008; Solomon et al., 2009; Eby et al., 2009, Solomon et al. 2010).

499

500 The coherence between cumulative emissions of carbon dioxide and global temperature  
501 changes has been the subject of several recent studies, and represents a new metric with  
502 which to assess the climate response to human CO<sub>2</sub> emissions. Matthews et al (2009) and  
503 Allen et al (2009) both identified a strong linear relationship between global temperature  
504 change and cumulative carbon emissions. Matthews et al (2009) named this the “carbon-  
505 climate response.”. In this study, they showed the carbon-climate response is well  
506 constrained by both coupled climate-carbon models and historical observations to lie  
507 between 1 and 2.1 °C per 1000 GtC emitted (see Figure 5 below, taken from NRC, 2011).  
508 Allen et al (2009) used a simpler climate model, but considered a larger range of possible  
509 climate sensitivities; as a result, they estimated that the instantaneous temperature change  
510 associated with cumulative carbon emissions fell between 1.4 and 2.5 °C per 1000 GtC  
511 emitted.

512 Cumulative carbon emissions provides a clear means of estimating the extent of climate  
513 warming that will occur from wide range of future CO<sub>2</sub> emissions scenarios.  
514 Consequently, the anthropogenic warming that will occur, and which will persist for  
515 many subsequent centuries, will be determined to a large extent by the total cumulative  
516 emissions which occur between now and the time by which humans stop emitting  
517 significant amounts of carbon dioxide. If a tipping point (Lenton et al., 2008) in the  
518 earth system were to be experienced at any time in the future, even the immediate  
519 cessation of CO<sub>2</sub> emissions will be unable to substantially lower the global temperature  
520 even on timescales of tens of generations.

521

#### 522 4. Policy Outlook

523

524 Reducing emissions of shorter-lived gases and aerosols (e.g., black carbon) is indeed a  
525 highly effective way to reduce climate forcing or the rate of warming on shorter  
526 timescales as shown by many authors (see e.g. UNEP, 2011; Jacobson, 2002; Shindell et  
527 al., 2012 and references therein), and illustrated here in Figure 6. But Figure 3 above  
528 provides key context to better understand choices among policy options. In particular,  
529 Figure 3c goes beyond the timescale shown in Figure 6 to illustrate that reductions of  
530 short-lived gases or aerosols should be most appropriately thought of as an approach to  
531 “trimming the peak” warming (and perhaps the rate of warming) in the near term (but  
532 recall the discussion in connection with Figure 3, bearing on the question of choices  
533 between efforts put into peak trimming versus additional CO<sub>2</sub> reductions). Furthermore,  
534 delays in the abatement of short lived forcing agents imply greater heat storage in the

535 deep ocean and greater sea level rise; thus, the utility of the peak trimming is affected by  
536 when it is implemented as well as by how much. Peak trimming can also reduce the rate  
537 of warming, with attendant benefits for the ability of human and natural systems to adapt.  
538 Greater benefits in peak trimming are obtained the sooner the emissions are abated (see  
539 Held et al., 2010). However, Figure 3c also shows that the long term climate – i.e. the  
540 character of the “Anthropocene” – is determined largely by the cumulative carbon  
541 emitted. It is noteworthy that the use of  $GWP_{100}$  in a policy vehicle would consider the  
542 “Methane First” scenario to be equivalent to the “CO<sub>2</sub> First” scenario, but the figure  
543 makes clear that the latter yields a far better outcome if one is concerned about the  
544 climate changes that last beyond 100 years. Thus Figure 3c demonstrates why trimming  
545 the peak cannot substitute for reductions in carbon dioxide emissions that will dominate  
546 Earth’s climate for many centuries if unabated.

547

548 A key policy issue involves the relative reductions to make in the emissions of the range  
549 of greenhouse gases. The Kyoto Protocol addressed this issue by placing the regulated  
550 greenhouse gases into a single basket and relating their emissions in a common CO<sub>2</sub>-  
551 equivalent emission determined by multiplying actual emissions with the 100-yr  $GWP_h$ .  
552 Numerous studies have demonstrated that using a single metric in this way has  
553 drawbacks arising from the disparity in global lifetimes of the various gases. As we have  
554 illustrated here, the choice of a particular time horizon includes value judgments  
555 regarding the importance of climate changes at varying times. For example, if a  $GWP_h$   
556 with a short time horizon is used in order to better equate short-term climate impacts  
557 among gases, the larger relative impact of gases with long lifetimes over long timescales



558 will not be considered. Perhaps more importantly, the use of the  $GWP_h$  as the trading  
559 metric leads to greenhouse gas trading based on relative integrated radiative forcing,  
560 which has a limited connection to temperature change (as shown by the comparison of  
561  $GTP_h$  to  $GWP_h$ ) but probably better represents sea level rise (Smith and Wigley, 2000).  
562 Many studies have examined ways to more effectively address near-term and long-term  
563 warming (e.g., Manne and Richels, 2001 and others), but the majority of policy  
564 discussions have revolved around greenhouse gas metrics for a given time that cannot  
565 account for time-varying policy goals.

566

567 The Montreal Protocol regulated ozone-depleting substances (ODSs) that were also  
568 characterized by very different lifetimes. This Protocol was highly successful in reducing  
569 ozone depletion and took a different approach from that of the Kyoto Protocol. Rather  
570 than group all ODSs into a single basket in which production and consumption reductions  
571 could be traded using some metric like the ozone depletion potential (ODP), the Montreal  
572 Protocol effectively regulated groups of gases (e.g., CFCs, HCFC, halons) and some  
573 individual gases (e.g.,  $CH_3CCl_3$ ,  $CCl_4$ ,  $CH_3Br$ ) separately. Members of these groups were  
574 largely characterized by similar lifetimes. It has been shown that if the Montreal Protocol  
575 took an alternative single basket approach, and if trading among ODSs were possible and  
576 were performed, the success of the Protocol in limiting short term risks could have been  
577 compromised (Daniel et al., 2011).

578

579 The principal conclusion of the discussion presented in this paper is that the scientific  
580 basis for trading among all greenhouse gases in one single basket is poor, and a more

581 science-based approach for the Kyoto Protocol (and similar regulatory frameworks)  
582 would be to abandon the idea of a single-basket approach altogether. As we have shown,  
583 short-lived greenhouse gases or aerosols, and CO<sub>2</sub> are knobs that control quite different  
584 aspects of the future climate. It does not appear likely that any single metric will be able  
585 to fairly represent both. Yet both time scales are clearly important from the policy  
586 viewpoint of risks of different types of future climate changes, such as a possibly slow  
587 loss of ice from Greenland and Antarctica over millennia and associated massive sea  
588 level rise, versus the potential for rapid increases in the area burned by wildfire in the  
589 next decade or two. Thus, the research of the past few years shows even more clearly  
590 than previous studies that the existing single-basket GWP<sub>h</sub> framework is difficult to  
591 justify.

592

593 Many of the problems with GWP<sub>h</sub> and GTP<sub>h</sub> are not intrinsic to the metrics themselves,  
594 but to the imposition of a single time scale when computing the metric. As a minimum, a  
595 two-basket approach seems to be needed. One basket could be CO<sub>2</sub>, and the metric used  
596 to quantify the climate impact of that basket would be cumulative carbon emission  
597 (Matthews et al., 2009). Further work is needed to determine whether perfluorocarbons  
598 might also be included in this basket through a suitable adjustment of cumulative carbon.  
599 The long-term basket should be recognized as the only path to managing long-term risks  
600 to the climate. The second basket would include much shorter-lived forcing agents such  
601 as CH<sub>4</sub>, tropospheric ozone, and black carbon, which could be grouped together and  
602 measured by a metric such as the GTP<sub>h</sub>. Carbon dioxide can be considered here as well,  
603 since its growth is expected to be important for the rate of climate change in the near term

604 (as well as being not only dominant but controlling the changes in the long-term).  
605 Reducing short-lived gases or aerosols does nothing to reduce the long-term risk posed  
606 by substances such as carbon dioxide. This second basket would explicitly recognize  
607 and manage what can be done to reduce warming in the short-term time scale of decades  
608 or so, with the choice of time horizon  $h$  being essential. Such an approach would make  
609 explicit that reducing short-lived forcing agents can “trim the peak” of global warming  
610 but does not, as is sometimes erroneously stated, “buy time” to deal with carbon and  
611 other gases (Biello, 2012), unless one neglects entirely the longer term impacts of current  
612 actions. A two-basket framework would require careful and interactive analysis of the  
613 science, risks, and value judgments associated with choosing how much and when to  
614 reduce the short-lived and long-lived baskets, and we believe that it would result in a  
615 clearer path forward for mitigation policy.

616

617

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Figure 1 – Carbon dioxide concentrations measured in Antarctic ice cores. The blue curve shows the long record from several cores (available at [ftp://ftp.ncdc.noaa.gov/pub/data/paleo/icecore/antarctica/epica\\_domec/edc-co2-2008.txt](ftp://ftp.ncdc.noaa.gov/pub/data/paleo/icecore/antarctica/epica_domec/edc-co2-2008.txt)), while the red curve and inset shows data for 2000 years prior to 2005 (available at <ftp://ftp.ncdc.noaa.gov/pub/data/paleo/icecore/antarctica/law/law2006.txt>).




Figure 2 - (left) Best estimates and very likely uncertainty (90% confidence, as in Forster et al., 2007) ranges for aerosols and gas contributions to CO<sub>2</sub>-equivalent concentrations for 2005, based on the concentrations of CO<sub>2</sub> that would cause the same radiative forcing as each of these as given in Forster et al. (2007). All major gases contributing more than 0.15 W m<sup>-2</sup> are shown. Halocarbons including chlorofluorocarbons, hydrochlorofluorocarbons, hydrofluorocarbons, and perfluorocarbons have been grouped. Direct effects of all aerosols have been grouped together with their indirect effects on clouds. (right) Total CO<sub>2</sub>-equivalent concentrations in 2005 for CO<sub>2</sub> only, for CO<sub>2</sub> plus all gases, and for CO<sub>2</sub> plus gases plus aerosols. From Stabilization Targets, NRC, 2011.




Figure 3 - Surface temperature response of the two-layer ocean model subjected to various time-series of radiative forcing as follows (a) Pulse emission of gases with various lifetimes but identical  $GWP_{100}$ . The emission corresponds to an initial radiative forcing of  $1 \text{ W m}^{-2}$  for the shortest-lived gas. (b) Constant emission rate up to year 200 for an infinite lifetime  $\text{CO}_2$ -like gas vs. a short-lived methane-like gas having the same  $GWP_{100}$ . The total mass of short-lived gas emitted is the same as in the pulse emission calculation shown in (a). (c) Temperature increases from the  $\text{CO}_2$  time series in test cases in Eby et al.(2009), corresponding to cumulative carbon emissions of 640 or 1280 GtC between 2000 and 2300, alone or with superposed effect of constant-rate methane emissions with total  $GWP_{100}$ -weighted emissions equal to the difference in  $\text{CO}_2$  emissions between the two cases; all emissions cease by 2300.




Figure 4 –

Figure 4 - Climate response to zero CO<sub>2</sub> emissions, compared to the climate response to constant atmospheric CO<sub>2</sub> concentration. Upper panel shows the global temperature response to zero-emissions from three models (Lowe et al., 2009; Solomon et al., 2009; Matthews and Weaver, 2010) and constant-composition scenarios, as in Matthews and Weaver (2010) and references therein. Lower panel shows the CO<sub>2</sub> emissions scenarios associated with the red and blue lines in panel (a), with cumulative emission given for the historical period (blue shaded area, corresponding to the historical portion of both scenarios) and the future emissions associated with the constant-composition scenario (red shaded area).




Figure 5 - Climate response to cumulative carbon emissions (“carbon-climate response”), estimated from historical observations of CO<sub>2</sub> emissions and CO<sub>2</sub>-attributable temperature changes (thick black line with dashed uncertainty range), as well as from coupled climate-carbon cycle models (colored lines). Both historical observations and model simulations of the 21<sup>st</sup> century show that the carbon-climate response is approximately constant in time, indicating a linear relationship between cumulative carbon emissions and globally-averaged temperature change. See Matthews et al. (2009) for details.




Figure 6 - Observed deviation of temperature to 2009 and projections under various scenarios considered in UNEP (2011) and Shindell et al. (2012); see Shindell et al. (2012) for details. The bulk of the benefits of the assumed CH<sub>4</sub> and black carbon reduction measures are realized by 2040, with the longer term warming being increasingly dependent on carbon dioxide emissions.



Table 1. Atmospheric removals and data required to quantify global radiative forcing for a variety of forcing agents.

Substance	CO <sub>2</sub>	Perfluorochemicals (CF <sub>4</sub> , NF <sub>3</sub> , C <sub>2</sub> F <sub>6</sub> , etc.)	N <sub>2</sub> O	Chlorofluorocarbons (CFCl <sub>3</sub> , CF <sub>2</sub> Cl <sub>2</sub> , etc.)	CH <sub>4</sub>	Hydrofluorocarbons (HFC-134a, HCFC-123, etc.)	Tropospheric O <sub>3</sub>	Black carbon	Total all aerosols
Atmospheric removal or lifetime	Multiple processes; most removed in 150 years but ≈15-20% remaining for thousands of years	500 to 50000 years, depending on specific gas	≈120 years	≈50 to 1000 years, depending on specific gas	≈10 years	One to two decades to years, depending on specific gas (HFC-23 is exceptional with a lifetime of 270 years).	Weeks	Days	Days
Information on past global changes to quantify radiative forcing	Ice core data for thousands of years; in-situ data for half century quantify global changes well	Some ice core for CF <sub>4</sub> . In-situ data quantify current amounts and rates of change well	Ice core data for thousands of years; in-situ data for half century quantify global changes well	Snow (firn) data for hundreds of years; in-situ data for more than three decades quantifies the global changes well	Ice core data for thousands of years; in-situ data for half century quantify global changes well	In-situ data quantifies recent global changes well; clear absence of any significant natural sources avoids need for pre-industrial data	Variable distribution poorly sampled at limited sites; uncertain inferences from satellite data since 1979; very few pre-industrial data.	Extremely variable distribution poorly sampled at limited sites. Some satellite data in last few decades; a few firm data for pre-industrial amounts	Extremely variable distribution poorly sampled at limited sites; some satellite data in last 1-2 decades; no pre-industrial data